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CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally,   the  predominant  occupation of women   in  the United 
[States  has  been  that of homemaker.     However,   increasing  numbers of Amer- 
ican women  are  securing  paid work outside  the  home;   they  are  adding other 
[occupations   to  that  of  homemaker.     The  purpose of  this  thesis   is  to analyze 
statistically  the  general   hyposthesis  that  there  is  an   income differential 
between  black and white  females   in  the United  States work  force.     The  type 
jof discrimination,   then,   that  this  thesis  concerns   itself with  is  racial 
discrimination  among   females. 
Discrimination  Defined 
The problem of defining  discrimination   is  a most  difficult one. 
Generally,  economists  discuss  discrimination  in  terms of cost,  a  term 
which also has  several  meanings.     Discrimination,  defined   in  very broad 
terms,  occurs whenever market  allocations  are made  such  that  non  pecuniary 
or extraneous  factors  play  a   role—that   is,   for example,  where   race,   reli- 
gion,  or  sex affect   the distribution of goods and services  and jobs. 
(2,   1973,   P-   1) 
A  long   list  of  types  of discrimination could  be  compiled,  but  most 
can  be  placed   in one  of  the   following  categories:     1)   employment  discrim- 
ination  occurs  when  unemployment,  both  full-time  and  part-time,   is concen- 
trated  among minority  groups;   2)  wage  discrimination  occurs  when  minority 
workers  are  paid   less   for  doing   the  same work as  others;   3)   occupational 
discrimination occurs when criteria other  than  productivity  determine  the 
relative quantity of a   factor employed   in  a given occupation;   4)   human 
capital   discrimination  occurs when   less  is   invested  in  the education and 
training of  minorities   than of others;  5)   capital   discrimination occurs 
when  price or quantitive  controls   limit minority group members'   ability 
to  borrow  from the  capital   markets or when  the  rate of   return on  their 
capital   is  artificially   lower;  6)   racial   discrimination occurs whenever 
race   is  a  factor  in predicting  the opportunities open  to an   individual; 
7)   sex  discrimination occurs whenever  sex  is  a   factor   in  predicting  the 
opportunities  open  to an   individual   and;   8)   price discrimination  occurs 
when minority  group  buyers  are   required  to pay more than  the market  prices 
or when minority group  sellers must  sell   at  below market  prices.      (3,   1973 
pp.   10-11)     This definition  is quite  different   from the  definition of price 
discrimination   found   in microeconomic  theory. 
Racial   Discrimination Among  Females 
Before  proceeding   further  some   interesting  data  should  be  noted.      In 
1969,   black women working   50 weeks or more had a median   income   level   of 
$4,126,   about  80 percent  of  the $5,182   for white women who worked  the  same 
length of  time   (see  Table   1.1).     Among women 25 year and older,   the median 
income  for  those who had only high  school   education was  bout  the  same  for 
blacks  and whites.     Black  women who completed  k  years of college made  sharp- 
er gains   in   income  than white women.     The median   income of black women who 
had  completed  college was  about  $1,000 more  than  for white women with  the 
same  educational   attainment   (see Table   1.2).     About one-fourth of all   black 
women who were  heads of  families and worked  in   1969 were  below the poverty 
income   level  although  they  worked  full-time   (see Table   1.3).      (Roughly 
kk  percent  of  black and other minority  group mothers with  young children 
who worked  compared  to  roughly  27  percent of white mothers.)     Among  the 
married women who  have  no  children  under  5  years old  about   63  percent  of 
the women of  black  and other minority groups are   in  the  labor  force.     White 
single women,   however,   are more often  in  the   labor force  than  black and 
other  minority  group women.     Thus,  about  86 percent of white  single women 
25  to 29 years  old   in   1969 were  in  the   labor  force as  compared  to about 
65  percent of  single  black women and of other minority  group  women   in  the 
same  age  category   (see  Table  1.4).     A higher  proportion of  black  than of 
white women  are   in  service  and  private  household occupations.     Clerical 
and  sales occupations  are  predominantly  held by white women,   regardless  of 
their  marital   status.     However,  only  single  black women are  concentrated 
in  clerical   and  sales  occupations   (see Table   1.5).     Substantial   proportions 
of both  black and  white  female  heads of  families  were  separated or divorced. 
However,   separated or  divorced women were more prevalent among  black  heads 
of  families   (see  Table   1.6). 
Plan  of  Study 
The main   thrust  of  this   thesis   is  to examine  the  theories of  the 
economics of discrimination  and  to  develop a  modest  econometric model   that 
will   analyze  statistically  the general   hypothesis  that  there   is an   income 
differential   between  black and white  females   in  the United  States work  force. 
Except  as   it  concerns  evidence  necessary  for evaluating  these  theories  this 
thesis   is  not  concerned  with  the empirical   research on  this  subject. 
The  outline of  the  thesis   is  as  follows:     Chapter  2  contains  a  sur- 
vey of  the  literature  giving  particular attention  to  the works  of  Gary Becker 
and other  neoclassical   economists.     Chapter  3  focuses  on  the development 
of the econometric model,   the  collection  of data,  and  tests  on  the  model. 
Chapter  k  contains  the  summary with policy   implications with   respect  to 
the elimination  of   income  differentials  between  black  and white  females. 
Table  1.1 
Median   Income of  Female Year-Round  Full"Time 
Workers,   by Age,   1969 
Number wi th  income Median   income,   1969 Ratio,   black to 
Age (thousands) (dollars) white median 
i ncome 
Negro White Negro White 
Total 1,718 13,541 4,126 5,182 80 
14 to  19 years 24 333 (a) 3,423 (a) 
20  to  24 years 217 1,996 3,926 4,714 83 
25 to 34 years 452 2,294 4,439 5.496 81 
35  to 44 years 450 2,644 4,556 5,314 86 
45  to 54  years 359 3,452 3,818 5,423 70 
55 to 64 years 192 2,386 3,701 5,283 70 
65 years  and 24 436 (a) 4,841 (a) 
over 
(a)     Base   less  than  75,000 
Source:     The United  States  Department  of  Commerce, 
The  Social   and  Economic  Status of Negroes 
In  The  United  States,   1970,   BLS  Report 
No.   39T!     Current  Population  Reports, 
Series P-23, No.   38. 
Table  1.2 
Median   Income of Women  25 Years  Old  and Over,  by 
Educational   Attainment,   1969 
Women 25  years Median 1ncome, 
Years of  school   completed and over,   1970 1969 
(thousands) (doll ars) 
Negro White Negro White 
Total,   25  years  and over 4,397 33,402 2,078 2,513 
Elementary:     Less  than  8  years 
8 years   .   .    .   .   ■ 
1,261 
496 
4,028 
4,447 
1,195 
1,320 
1,303 
1,688 
High  School:     1   to  3  years   .   , 
4  years     .    .   .   . 
1,075 
1,054 
5,562 
12,673 
2,268 
3,257 
2,355 
3,234 
Co)lege:      1   to  3  years   .    .   .   . 
4 years  or more     .   . 
285 
226 
3,395 
3,296 
4,247 
6,747 
3,427 
5,707 
Increase   in median   income: 
College  4  years or more 
over elementary 8 years     .   . N.A. N.A. 5,427 4,019 
College  4  years or more 
over  high  school   4  years   .   . N.A. N.A. 3,485 2,473 
N.A.   -  not  applicable 
Source:     The  United  States   Department  of  Commerce, 
The  Social   and  Economic  Status  of Negroes 
In  The  United States,   1970,  BLS   Report 
No.   394:     Current  Population  Reports, 
Series  P-23,   No.   38. 
Table   1.3 
Families   by   Low   Income   Status,   and   Sex, 
and Work  Experience of Head,   1969 
Al1   fami1 
Negro 
ies,   1970 
White 
Wor k  status of head  in   1969 
Subject Head worked          Head  worked   full-time 
Negro White Negro White 
Male head: 
Total   (thousands)   .... 3,425 41,836 2,996 36,476 2,203 29,265 
Percent  below the 
low  income   level   (a)     .   . 18 6 14 k 9 2 
Female   head: 
Total    (thousands)   .... 1,3*9 4,186 825 2,467 366 1,360 
Percent  below the 
low  income   level   (a)     .   . 53 25 43 
  
17 24 k 
(a)     The   low  income   level   is  sometimes   referred  to as   the poverty   level.     The  poverty   level, 
classifies  families as  being  above or  below the   low   income   level,   using cutoffs  adjusted 
to  the account  of  such  factors  as  family  size,   sex and  age of  the  family  head,   the  number 
of children,   and  farm-nonfarm  residence.     The   low  income cutoffs  for  farm  families  have 
been  set  at  85  percent of  the nonfarm  levels.     The   low   income  threshold  for  a  nonfarm 
family of  four was  $3,968  in   I960,  S3,743  in   1969,  and  $2,973   in  1959-     In   1970,   the  low 
income  threshold  ranged  from about  $2,500  for  a  family of  two persons  to  $6,^00  for  a 
family with  7 or more  persons. 
Source: The United States Department of Commerce, The Social and Economic Status of Negroes 
In The United States, 1970, BLS Report No. 394: Current Population Reports, Series 
P-23, No. 38. 
Table  1.4 
Labor Force  Status of Women   15  to 49  Years  Old,   by Age of 
Women  and  Presence of Young  Children,   1969 
Percent   in   labor force 
S ingle 
Women 
Women ever married 
Age  and  Race Total With own Without  own 
chi ldren children  under 
under 5  yrs. 5 yrs. old 
old 
Negro  and Other 
minori ty groups 
15  to 49  years   .    .    . 40 56 44 63 
15  to 24  years  .    .   . 35 50 47 56 
25  to 29  years   .   .    . 65 55 47 66 
30  to 49  years   .    .   . 62 57 39 63 
White 
15  to  49  years   .    .   . 48 45 27 54 
15  to 24  years   .    .   . 43 47 32 68 
25  to 29  years   .    .   . 86 37 26 57 
30  to  39  years  .   .   . 80 41 24 51 
40  to  49  years   .    .   . 74 51 25 53 
Source:     The  United  States  Department of  Commerce, 
The  Social   and  Economic  Status  of Negroes 
In  The  United  States,   1970,  BLS  Report 
No.   394:     Current  Population  Reports, 
Series  P-23,   No.   38. 
Table   1.5 
Distribution  by Major  Occupation of  Employed Women  by 
Marital   Status  and  Race,   1970 
Occupation S i ngle 
Married  husband 
present 
Other marital 
status 
Negro White Negro White Negro White 
Professional,   technical 
and managerial   .   .   . 
Clerical   and   sales   .   . 
Craftsmen  and 
Farmers/farm 
Service workers     .   .   . 
Private  household 
workers and 
13 
39 
13 
(a) 
25 
11 
22 
A9 
9 
(a) 
13 
8 
16 
21 
18 
1 
28 
17 
21 
1* 
17 
2 
.5 
2 
8 
16 
19 
1 
30 
28 
18 
38 
18 
2 
19 
6 
(a)     Represents  zero 
Source:     The  United  States   Department of  Commerce, 
The  Social   and  Economic  Status  of Negroes 
in   the United  States,   1970,   BLS  Report 
No.   394:     Current  Population  Reports, 
Series  P-23,   No.   38. 
Table  1.6 
Marital   Status of Female  Heads 
of  Fami1ies,   1970 
10 
 Marital   Status  
Total,   female  heads   (thousands) 
Percent,   total    
Single   (never married)   .... 
Separated or  divorced     .... 
Separated      
Divorced    
Married,   husband  absent     .   .   . 
In  armed   forces      
Other  reasons      
Widowed      
Negro White 
1,349 4,186 
100 100 
16 9 
k8 
34 
14 
37 
11 
25 
6 
2 
4 
7 
3 
5 
30 47 
Source:     The United  States Department of  Commerce 
The  Social   and  Economic  Status  of Negroes 
In  The United  States,   1970,   BLS  Report 
No.   394:     Current  Population  Reports, 
Series  P-23,   No.   38. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
The  purpose  of  this  chapter   is   to examine  the  theories  of  the 
economics of  discrimination.     It will   concern   itself with  the empirical 
research on   this   subject.     Should   the  reader  find   it  necessary   to have 
information   regarding empirical   studies   in  this  area  see Dale  L.   Hiestand, 
Discrimination   In   Employment:     An Appraisal   Of  The  Research.     (12,   1970). 
Although  some  aspects of   the economics of discrimination  probably  are 
applicable   to  discrimination  between  the  sexes  and other  forms of discrimi- 
nation,   the  emphasis of  this  chapter will   be on  racial   discrimination. 
The  Neoclassical   Model 
The  first  statement  of  the  neoclassical   model   of discrimination 
was  by  F.  Y.   Edgeworth  in   1922   (9,   1922 pp.   k^-kSl) ,   but  most of  the work 
in  the United  States  follows  Gary  S.   Becker's  The  Economics  of  Discrimination 
(5,   1971).     Many economists  have  elaborated on  the Becker analysis,  but   the 
most  complete  statement of   the  neoclassical  model  was   formulated  by  Kenneth 
Arrow's   (3,   1972;   4,   197*0   "Models  of  Job  Discrimination"  and  "Some Models 
of  Race   In The  Labor Market." 
The  Becker  Model 
Becker  states  that,   "If an individual  has  a  'taste  for discrimination', 
he must  act  as   if  he were willing to pay something,  either  directly or   in 
the  form of  reduced   income,   to be associated with  some  persons   instead  of 
others".     (5,   1971   p.   1+)     Becker makes   the  usual   assumptions  of   the 
13 
neoclassical  wage   theory,   namely  perfect  competition,   homogeneous   factors 
of  production,   and  fixed  institutional   arrangements. 
Becker  defines  a  coefficient of discrimination   to measure   this 
"taste  for discrimination"   in money  terms   for  different  factors  of  pro- 
duction,   employers,   and consumers,  where   it  is  assumed   that  the  factors 
of production  are equally productive.     If an employer   faces  a money wage 
rate of W  for workers,   then W(l+dj)* defines a  net wage  rate, where dj    is 
the  discrimination  coefficient  against   this  factor.      116,   1971*)      If  the 
employer  has  a  preference  for   this  factor,  dj  will   be  positive;   if he 
has  a   taste  for discrimination  against   it,   it will   be  negative. 
The market  discrimination coefficient   (MDC)   is  defined as  MDC=WW-Wb, 
"ifc 
where  W     is   the  equilibrium wage  rate of white workers  and Wb  is   the 
equi1ibriurn wage  rate  for  black workers. 
An  employee offered a wage  rate of W-  for working with  the  factor 
discriminated  against acts  as   if  the net wage  rate were Wj(l-dj),  where  dj 
is  his  discrimination  coefficient  against  this  factor.     A consumer,   faced 
with a  money  price of  P for the  commodity  produced  by  this  factor,   acts 
as   if   the  net  price were  P(l+dk), where dk   is  the  discrimination  coefficient 
against   this  factor.     Most  neoclassical  economists  assumed  that   the model 
is  applicable  to  sex and other   forms  of market discrimination as well   as 
race. 
The obvious   implication of  the discrimination  coefficient   is  that 
the employer   is willing   to pay   the  favored workers   (W+d,)   and  the ones 
discriminated  against   (W-d-),   so  that   if Ww  is  the wage  rate of white 
'Notation   is  that  of  Ray Marshall,  "The  Economics  of  Racial   Discrimination: 
A Survey",   Journal   of   Economic  Literature,   September,   197t,  Vol.   12. 
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workers  and  W.    the wage  rate of black workers  and  employers  prefer whites 
to blacks   then Ww> Wb. 
Becker  utilizes  an   international   trade model   to  illustrate  the 
effects  of  discrimination on  trade  between  two sectors;  sector w and b. 
He  assumes  perfect  competition  and,   relative  to  labor power,   that whites 
own  more  capital   than  blacks.     Therefore  Cw.Cb,  where  Cw=white  capital, 
Cb=black capital,   Lw=white  labor and 
w      b     Lb=black  labor.     Becker 
further  assumes   identical   linear  homogeneous  production  functions  and 
perfect mobility  of  capital   and   labor  between sectors.     It,   therefore, 
follows  that  before   trade,   (1)   MPLb<MPLw and  (2)   MPCw<MPCb,  where MPLb 
and  MPL    are   the  marginal   productivities  of  labor   in b and w  sectors, 
respectively,   and  MPCW and  MPCb  are  the marginal   productivities of capital 
in w  and  b  respectively. 
Thus,   before   trade,  w capitalists  could get  a  higher  return   in b 
and  b   laborers  could  get  a  higher  return   in w.     Whites will  export  Cx, 
the amount of  capital   exported  that will   achieve equilibrium  between  sectors, 
so  that   (3)   Cb+Cx=Cw-Cx=C     and  the MPCw=MPCfa and  the MPLw-MPLb.     Stated 
simply   the Lb Lw    Lw total   returns  per  unit of   labor  and capital 
in both  sectors  are  equal   and maximized  so  that gains  cannot  be made by 
additional  exports  of  capital. 
Introducing  discrimination   into  the model   causes w capitalists  to 
suffer  "psychic  costs" whenever  their capital   is  not  used  in  b,  so  that 
their   net  return   is  MPCb(l+d)  --where d  is  a negative  fraction  representing 
the money  value of  the psychic costs.     The  discrimination coefficient 
reduces   capital   exports  to a   level   below Cx. 
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Comparing   this   result with   the  competitive equilibrium without 
discrimination,   the  marginal   productivity of  b   labor will  decrease,   the 
marginal   productivity of  b  capital  will   increase,   the  marginal   productivity 
of w capital  will   decrease,   and   the marginal   productivity of w  labor will 
increase.     Because  production   is  no  longer efficient,   the country  as  a 
whole   loses when w  capitalists  discriminate.     Moreover,  b workers  and w 
capitalists   lose   income,  while w workers  and b capitalists  gain.     Therefore, 
in Becker's  model   the  coefficient  of discrimination acts   like a  tariff 
and  causes   lower wages,   less  employment,  or  both  depending on  the elastic- 
ities  of   labor  supplies. 
Criticisms  and Modifications  of  the Becker Model 
With   regard   to  the  Becker model  of  international   trade  even  if 
white  capitalists  discriminate against  black  labor such  that  C       Cb 
yielding  MPP,<MPP,      and  should  the  black  sector  produce 
labor   intensive  goods   and Wb=Ww>   then by  the Heckscher  hypothesis one 
must  build   in a discrimination against  products  or wages will   be equalized 
through  free   trade. 
Ann  Krueger  extends   the  international   trade model   to  find an optimum 
level  of  discrimination analogous  to an optimum  tariff.      (15,   1963 PP-   W1- 
86)    Krueger also discusses ways by which exporting white capital   to blacks 
might  be  curtailed  even   if white  capitalists  themselves  have  no  personal 
tastes   for  discrimination.     For example   if white capitalists were  interested 
in maximizing   the   incomes  of  all  whites   rather  than maximizing   their own 
income,   the  resulting  welfare   function would  be similar   to Becker's  except 
that discrimination would  take  the  form of maximizing  real   income  for 
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whites  rather  than avoiding working with  blacks.     This concept  departs 
from  the  usual   neoclassical   assumption  of  individual   decision  making 
processes  and  assumes   that  employers'   racial   interests might  modify   their 
profit  motives. 
Marcus Alexis  extends  the  neoclassical   analysis,  especially  the 
motivations  based  on  race developed  by  Krueger,   to  deal  with  problems 
involved with  Becker's  assumption  that whites  are motivated  by  a  desire 
to avoid  associating with  blacks.     Becker's assumption makes   it  difficult 
to explain  discrimination  by  capitalists who do  not   physically  associate 
with  blacks.     Alexis  states  that  envy,  malice,  or  racial  considerations 
may  prompt  discrimination   in  this  form;   it   is assumed  that,   in  addition 
to  the  factors  discussed  by  the  neoclassical   utility   function,  white 
employers  might  be motivated  by  desire  to   increase  the relative wages 
going  to whites   (2,   1973 PP-   301-302). 
Alexis,   employing  a  Becker   type model,  adds  Y1   to the employer's 
utility  function,  where Y1   is   the  relative  share  of wage  income   received 
by white workers,   so  that  "black wages will   be  depressed more   (less)    in 
the  envy-malice model   than   in  the aversion model".      (2,   1973  P-   309) 
The  models  developed  by  Krueger and Alexis  seem more  congruent 
with  reality   than   the  aversion model.     However,   these  models   contain  no 
convincing  explanation of why white employers  should  want  to maximize 
white workers   income or exhibit  envy-malice  toward blacks.     Alexis  recog- 
nizes   that  his model   could  be  formulated   in  terms of  benevolence  toward 
white workers  by white  capitalists,  which  seems   to be  more probable  than 
envy-malice,   although,   status   is  a more   likely   factor   than envy-malice 
or benevolence   in  explaining white motives  for discrimination. 
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Alexis's  work   is  neoclassical   in  tradition,  he  recognizes  some 
limitations  of  this  approach,   i.e.,   the assumption of  flexible wages  and 
perfect  capital   markets.     Alexis  believes  a  general   equilibrium model   to 
be useful   in  this   regard.      (16,   197**  p.  851)     The works of  Krueger  and 
Alexis  also  depart  from  the  usual  neoclassical   assumption  that  group 
behavior and  race  motives  clearly  are  very  powerful   and  tend  to change 
alowly,   although   the assumption  that  employers  are  interested  in  maximizing 
the  incomes  of white workers  seems   incompatible with a  reality where 
employers  hire whites  and  blacks  even   though  blacks  do not  necessarily 
receive   lower wages   than whites.     (16,   197*1  PP-   851-852) 
Besides  the  difficulty of making  the aversion model   fit   into  reality, 
the  Becker model   has  other   limitations   for  those   interested   in  using   the 
theory of  discrimination  to explain  reality.     For  example,   a   long-run 
implication  of  the model   is  that employers with  no discrimination  coef- 
ficients would  hire  blacks  because Wb<Ww>   forcing competitors  to do  the 
same,   in which case,   under   long-run competitive  equilibrium,   the wages 
of minorities would equal   the wages  of whites   in either   integrated or 
segregated  situations.     Should Ww-W^d,. where d|   is   the money  value of 
the discrimination  coefficient,  employers would  hire only b's;   if Ww-Wb=d., 
work  forces  would  be   integrated.     The  above   implies  that  employers would 
change   their work  forces   in  response  to  changes   in  the wage  rates. 
Richard  Freeman,  an  economists writing   in  the neoclassical   tradition 
and  attempting  to modify  the  Becker model   to make   it conform  to  reality 
entials  and employment  patterns  are perceived  to where   racial   wage  differenti 
to be  stable,   suggests   that  discrimina ting employers might  survive because 
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of  limited  supplies  of  non-discriminating employers or workers with 
complementary  skills.     (11,   1973). 
This  argument   is  not a  convincing  one  under   long-run  equilibrium. 
Under  purely  competitive  assumptions,   there need  to exist only one  non- 
discriminating  employer who could  drive all  others out of business   in  the 
long-run.     This  statement assumes   that  the LRAC  curve  does  not  turn  upward. 
Black employers would  be  assumed  to be nondiscriminators against  blacks 
and   if  the  neoclassical   model  were correct   (assuming  black and white employers 
to be   identical),   black employers  should  be able  to  undercut  discriminating 
white employers ( 16,   197*1 p.   853).     Similarly,    it   is  not  reasonable  to 
assume  that   shortages  of  complementary skills  would  persist   in  the   long-run. 
(16,   197^ p.   853). 
Barbara  Bergmann  utilized  a  Becker-type  model   to  show how discrimi- 
nation can  cause wage differentials  between equally  skilled occupations 
(6,   1970;   7,    1971   pp.   29A-313).     Bergmann assumes   two occupations   requiring 
equal   skills,   one menial   (M)  and   the other prestigious (P).      In  M,  Wb=Ww, 
but   in P,   there   is  a  discrimination  coefficient  so  that  blacks  are  hired 
only   if W  > W..     The marginal   productivities of M and  P  depend on  the   labor 
supplies  for  M and  P.     Given  that   the occupations  are  segregated,   they 
will   remain   that  way  as  long  as Ww-Wb<d,.     Should Ww-Wb>dj,   blacks  enter 
P and  the wages  of  blacks   in  M   increases,  while  the wages  of both whites 
and  blacks  decline   in  P.     Equilibrium of wage  rates occur when  the wage 
rate of blacks   in M equals  the wage  rate of blacks   in  P  and ww-
w
b
=d
ip. 
where  d,     is   the money value of  the discrimination  coefficient  against 
blacks   in  P.     The marginal   productivities  and wages of  blacks   in  menial 
occupations  will   be   less  because of discrimination,   since  the  tendency 
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to restrict  blacks  to  those  occupations would  cause  the  supplies  of   labor  in 
them to be  larger  than  they would  have  been   in  the absence of discrimination. 
Bergmann's  analysis  suggests  that  discrimination  can  cause wage 
differentials  between  equally  skilled occupations  and  that  racial   wage 
differentials  may  be maintained  by occupational   segregation  rather  than 
by overt  wage discrimination.     Bergmann's analysis   is  also useful   in   indi- 
cating  that  the discrimination  coefficient differs among  occupations  because 
of status  considerations.     This   is  a more  reasonable premise  than  assuming 
that discrimination   is a  taste or  distaste for  physical   association. 
Kenneth Arrow  has developed one of  the more complete statements 
of  the  neoclassical   theory of discrimination   (4,   197**)•     Arrow's  main 
objective   is  to explain  racial  wage differentials  not  based on  productivity. 
Arrow's  model,   like  Becker's,   makes  all   of  the  usual   neoclassical   assumptions 
of  full   employment,   competition,  and  profit and  utility maximization.     He 
specifically  "seeks   to develop  further Becker's models  and  to relate  them 
more closely  to  the   theory of general   competitive equilibrium,   though 
frequently  by way of  contrast   rather  than agreement:'  (4,   1971* P-   5) • 
Arrow's  simplest case of employer  discrimination occurs when   the 
employer  seeks  to maximize  the  utility  function  UflT.b.w),  where profits 
are seen  as  trade-offs  between  the  number of black workers   (b)   to white 
workers   (w).     Capital   is given   In  the short-run,   therefore output   is 
f(w+b).     Profits are given byW-f(w+b)-WwW-WbB,  where Wb and Ww are wages 
of  blacks  and whites   respectively.     Should an employer  have  a  taste  for 
discrimination,   the marginal   utility of b   labor   is  negative   (assuming 
employers  are white)   and the  discrimination  coefficient,  db,   is  positive 
so  that MP.-W.+d.   and MP =W+d   ,  where  d    is negative   if  the  employer 
b    b    b www w 
1 
20 
has  a  preference  for whites or  zero  if  the employer has  no  racial   pref- 
erence.     Therefore,   ww~
wt,=db"dw^ ° 
and  eclui'ibrium  requires W      W.. 
If all firms have the same utility functions, they all would hire 
equal amounts of blacks and whites, and the allocation of labor would be 
efficient. The effect of discrimination is to redistribute income from 
black workers (b) to white workers (w) and employers. It is quite clear 
that white workers do not lose (MPw
=w
w
+d
w) 
and probably gain. The exact 
effect on  profits  depends  on  the  employer's  utility  function. 
Since MPw=MPb=MP,,   profits  are ir=f(L)-(MP,)L+dwW+dfaB where  L-w+b. 
Profits where  there   is  no discrimination  areWj=f{ L)-(MPj)L>  and  the change 
in profits would  be fT-% =d W+d.B.     If   it  is  assumed, which Arrow thinks r '       w      b 
plausible,   that  employee  satisfaction depends  on  the  ratio of black   (b) 
to white   (w)  workers,   then  dMtdJW) and employers  neither gain  nor  lose by 
discrimination. 
The  Dual   Labor Market  Hypothesis 
One  approach which has specifically challenged  the neoclassical 
model   is  the  "dual   labor market"  hypothesis.     Economists  have  long  known 
that   the   labor market  was  "balkanized" or divided   into noncompeting groups, 
but  the  dual   labor market   idea  became more popular with scholars who were 
studying  ghetto  labor markets  during  the  late   I960's  and early  I970's. 
These analysts at  first  studied ghetto  labor markets   in detail  and  then 
started  to  reformulate  some of  the   ideas of a segmented  labor market 
developed  by  Clark  Kerr,   Lloyd  Fisher,  Charles  KiIlingsworth,  and others 
(13,   1953;   10,   1954;   I*.   '968).     Although   it  is  still  more an hypothesis 
than a  theory   it  represents  a  specific alternative to  the  neoclassical   system. 
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Michael   Piore  states   the dual   labor market   hypothesis  concisely: 
The  basic  hypothesis  of  the dual   labor market was   that  the 
labor market   is  divided   into  two essentially distinct  sectors, 
termed  the  primary and  the  secondary sectors.     The former 
offers  jobs with  relatively  high wages,  good working  conditions, 
chances of  advancement,  equity  and due  process  in  the  administra- 
tion  of work  rules  and,  above all,  employment  stability.     Jobs 
in  the  secondary  sector,  by  contrast,   tend  to be  low paying, 
with  poorer working  conditions,   little chance of advancement; 
a  highly  personalized   relationship between  workers  and  super- 
visors  which   leaves wide  latitude  for  favoritism and   is  con- 
ducive  to  harsh  and  captricious work discipline;  and with 
considerable   instability  in jobs  and high  turnover among  the 
labor  force.     The hypothesis was  designed  to explain  the 
problems  of  disadvantaged,  particularly  black workers   in  urban 
areas,   which  had  previously  been  diagnosed  as  one of  unemploy- 
ment (18,   1972 p.   2). 
Piore  explains   the  separation of markets  by  a  number of  specific 
arguments,  which he  has   refined  and  analyzed  in some detail (17,   1970): 
(1)     Secondary markets  are distinguished  from primary markets  by 
the behavior  patterns,   especially  unstable employment, which  they  impose 
on  the workers   in   those markets.     Employers and workers adapt  to unstable 
conditions,   and   labor market   institutions contribute  to  the  perpetuation 
of  these  conditions.     Welfare,   for example,  contributes  to  segmentation 
by  providing   such   limited  support  that workers  are  forced   into  the  secondary 
market.     Unions  operate mainly   in  the  primary market  and  therefore  contribute 
to  the  perpetuation  of  better wages,   hours,  and  job  protection   in  that 
sector.     Unions  have more difficulty   in   the secondary sector because  the 
workers  have   little  power  to win  strikes.     The Employment  Security Service 
perpetuates  secondary  employment  conditions by  referring workers with  the 
prescribed  characteristics  to  secondary  jobs.     Workers   tend  to  be  barred 
from primary jobs  not  because of  their   lack of job  skills  but  because 
they work   intermittently  and are  not   reliable. 
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(2) Discrimination  perpetuates  segmentation by  restricting  certain 
workers  to  secondary markets  not  because of  their education and  skills 
but  because  they  have  superficial   characteristics  resembling most workers 
in  the  secondary market.     Peter Dueringer and  Michael   Piore emphasize 
that many workers   in   the  secondary  market  have  stable employment  even 
though  their  jobs  encourage   instability   (8,   1971). 
(3) While  technology   influences  the allocation of jobs  between 
the primary  and  secondary  sectors,   many  kinds  of work can  be performed  in 
either  sector and  fall   where  they  are because of  historical   decisions   to 
locate  them  there. 
CO     The  behavioral   traits  of workers   in  the  various   labor markets 
are  reinforced by class  associations.     Jobs   in  the various  sectors   tend 
to  be  filled  by  people  from particular classes.     Piore defines "mobility 
chains"  through which  people  pass   (17,   1970).     Workers  enter  these  chains 
from a  limited and  distinct  number  of points which  have economic and  social 
significance.     Therefore,   people   in  a given job will   tend  to be drawn   from 
a  limited  range of  schools,   neighborhoods,  and  types  of  family backgrounds; 
and  conversely,   people   leaving  the  same school   or neighborhood will   move 
into a  limited  set  of employment  possibilities. 
(5)     A number of   institutions  and  historical   forces  strengthen   labor 
market  segmentation.     The   importance of on-the-job  training as  a means  of 
acquiring  skills  has   increased  the  employer's   incentive  to hold  some workers 
in more stable jobs,  whereas other   institutions  have  perpetuated  instability. 
Migration of  disadvantaged workers   into urban  areas  perpetuates a  supply 
of workers   in  the  secondary markets. 
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Criticisms  of  the  Dual   Labor Market  Hypothesis 
The  dual   labor market  approach deals with  discrimination  mainly 
as a  factor  in   labor market  segmentation,  with no  special   theory of 
discrimination.     Because of  discrimination,   blacks  have a  high  probability 
of being  restricted  to  secondary   labor markets.     Moreover,   once  they get 
into  these markets,   the adaptive  forces at work  in   that  sector make   it 
difficult  for  blacks  to move   into primary markets. 
The  dual   labor market  analysis  is still   in   its  formative  stage 
and  therefore,   scarcely  qualifies  as  a "theory".     Thus  far,   it   is  a 
classification  system more  than  a  theory.     Moreover,   the  analysis  and 
description  apply  only  to parts  of  the economy and  are not,   therefore, 
a  complete  system.     Many  labor markets,  such  as  those for  craftsmen and 
independent  professional   and  technical  workers,   do not  fit  neatly   into 
that  system.     Moreover,   the origin and causes  of  labor market  segmentation 
are  not  satisfactorily  formulated. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE  EFFECTS  OF  PRODUCTIVITY  VARIABLES AND  LABOR 
MARKET  DISCRIMINATION  ON  THE  RELATIVE 
EARNINGS  OF  BLACK  FEMALES 
In   I960  the  median earnings  of  black  females was  $1146.05   (see 
Table  3.6)   compared   to $1489.32  for white  females   (see Table  3-6);   in 
1970  the median  earnings of black  females  was  $2217-72   (see Table  3-12) 
compared   to $2430.07  for white  females (see  Table  3-12).     In   I960  this 
means  that  black  females  earned approximately 77  percent  of what  white 
females  earned and   in   1970  black  females  earned  approximately 91   percent 
of what white females  earned.     Statistics  such as   these  have been   the 
cause of  much concern  during   the past  decade.     During  the Kennedy  and 
Johnson  administrations,   for   instance,  major efforts  to  reduce  labor 
market  discrimination and  to  improve  the educational  opportunities  of 
blacks  and  other minorities were  undertaken. 
This  chapter   investigates   the  causes  of  the  earnings gap  that 
existed  between black  and white females   in   I960 and   in   1970 and estimates 
how much of  these differentials  can  be attributed  to  (1)     differences   in 
education and other  variables   related  to  labor market  productivity,   and 
(2)     how much  is  assignable  to  labor market  discrimination.     Other  studies 
that  have  dealt with  the   issue of  income differentials   include  Duncan 
(2,   1968),  Gwartney   (4,   1970), Weiss   (6,   1970), and Fogel ( 3,  1966). 
The Conceptual   Framework 
Separate earnings  functions  are  estimated for  black  and white 
females.     This  technique  is   identical   to one  as employed  by Masters. 
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(5i   197*1)•     Assume   that  these earnings   functions are perfectly specified, 
that  is,  given a  set of  values  for  the  independent  variables,  an  indi- 
vidual's earnings   can  be  predicted with  perfect  accuracy.     Labor market 
discrimination can  be defined  as  the difference between average  black and 
white  earnings  that  would  exist  if  blacks  and whites  had  the  same average 
values  for all   independent  variables. 
Operationally,   the  estimate of  the effect  of  labor market discrimi- 
nation   is  derived   by  substituting  the mean black values  for  the  inde- 
pendent  variables   into  the white earnings  function.     Let  this   result  be 
represented  by  f   (EBL) and   let  the actual   mean earnings of blacks  be 
represented  by   (EBL).     Then,   if  the earnings  function were  perfectly 
specified,   f   (EBL)-(EBL)  would  represent  the effect of  labor market  dis- 
crimination against   blacks.     See Bergmann   (1,   1971)   for some  results 
supporting  this  general   view. 
The effect  of  differences  in  all   of  the   independent  variables  are 
estimated  by  substituting   the average white values  for  these  variables 
into  the  black  earnings  function  and  calculating  fb(EWH)-(EBL).     Note 
that  this  effect  plus   the  effect of  labor  market  discrimination may 
not  sum  to  the  total   racial   earnings  gap,   therefore  fj EBL)-(EBL)  +  f(EWH)- 
(EBL)  may  not  equal    (  EWH)-(EBL)   .     If  labor market  discrimination were 
eliminated  and   if  blacks were also given   the white values  for  education 
and  the  other   independent  variables affecting productivity  and   labor 
market  conditions  the  total   might  be greater   (less)   than  the   individual 
effects   since blacks  with  above average education may  face greater (  less) 
discrimination   in  the   labor  market. 
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Sample  Data  and  Variables 
Before estimating  earnings   functions  for black and white  females 
based on   the data  contained   in  the  I960 Census  of Population   it  is 
necessary  to  test  for a  significant  difference  in  their   incomes.     The 
results  of  the  tests  are  presented   in  Table  3-1- 
These  results  are based  upon  aggregate data   representing a  sample 
of female  earnings   in  twenty  traditionally  southern  and  twenty  non-southern 
SMSA's.     The  females   included   in  the sample  range  in  age  from  \k  to 65. 
Those females  under  age  lA and  over age 65 are excluded  because,  among 
other  things,   their  number  in  the working  force   is  very  small. 
The  dependent  variable  is   the natural   log of annual   earnings.     The 
natural   log of annual   earnings   is  employed  because  it gives  a  better "fit" 
for  the   regression  equations  and  because most manpower economists  use  this 
technique.     The  primary  independent  variables  are median  education and work 
experience.     Median education  is  denoted   by  EDBL and   EDWL  for black and 
white  females,   respectively.     Work experience  is denoted  by  EXPBl  for 
black  females  and  is  defined  as median  age minus  five   (AGBL-5); work 
experience  for white  females   is  denoted  by  EXPWH  and   is  defined as median 
age minus  five   (AGWH-5).     The constant  5  is  subtracted  from median age 
because  most   individuals enter school  at  age  six. 
In  addition  to  these  independent  variables  the use of a  dummy 
variable  for  geographic  region  seems appropriate.     The dummy variable 
is denoted  by  DUM.     Those black  females   living   in  the  non-southern 
SMSA's  receive  a  value  of  1   and  those  living   in  the  traditionally 
southern SMSA's  receive a  value of 0.     The dummy variable  is  employed 
to see  if  black  females  living  in  the  traditionally southern  SMSA's  are 
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experiencing discrimination   in  the  labor market.     The dummy variable will 
"pick  up"  a  constant  difference   in  salaries  between southern and  non- 
southern   regions,   thereby  accounting  for absolute differences   in  salaries 
between  the  two  regions. 
Table  3-**  reflects   the mean values  of  the  variables,   their  variances, 
standard deviations,   and  coefficient  of variations.     Table  3.5  shows   that 
portion of  the  earnings  gap  that  can  be attributed  to  labor market  dis- 
crimination and  to differences   in productivity variables. 
The  portion  of  the earnings gap attributable  to  labor market  dis- 
crimination may  be  found by  employing  the  following  formula: 
Actual   earnings  of      Predicted earnings 
MD=  black  females -  of black  females 
Actual   earnings of black  females 
The  portion of  the earnings  gap  attributable  to differences   in  productivity 
may  be  found  by  employing  the  following  formula: 
White  female Black  female 
P0= mean earnings    -     predicted  earnings 
White  female mean  earnings 
In both instances black female predicted earnings are obtained by sub- 
stituting the mean black values for the independent variables into the 
white female  earnings   function. 
The  results   thus  far  suggest  that  (1)     statistically  there   is  a 
difference   in  the earnings  of  black and white  females   living   in  the 
southern  SMSA's,   the  non-southern  SMSA's,  and   in  the United  States 
(achieved  by  combining  southern and non-southern  SMSA's)(  2)     black 
females   living   in  the  southern SMSA's  face some  form of  labor market 
discrimination  relative  to white  females   living   in   the  same  region 
(3)     a  small   change  in  either median education or work experience will 
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significantly  change  the earnings  of black  females   (k)     that most  of  the 
difference   in earnings may  be attributed  to productivity and  not  to  labor 
market  discrimination. 
With  respect  to #4,   the analysis  suggests  that  given  the predicted 
earnings  of  black females   using   the white  females earnings   function,  and, 
given  the acutal  earnings  of white  females,  white  females  are  discriminated 
against  in   the   labor market;   using   I960 data  this  reverse  discrimination 
amounted  to  approximately  2%.     This  finding   is  contrary  to  popular  belief 
and should  be  set  forth with some   reservations. 
Table 3.1 
Test for Differences Between Incomes of Black 
and White Females for the Year of I960 
(MrV-do (M)-M2)-d(), wh ere dQ=0 
estimated 6  difference 
1/ '      V?+N2S2 YN2 
V W2 N1N2 
White Female Black  Female 
Region                                        Earnings Earni ngs T Statistic 
Southern SMSA's                       1411.80 937.25 4.31* 
Non-Southern  SMSA's              1566.85 1354.85 2.01* 
United States                        1489.32 1146.05 4.16 
•'Significant at .05 level 
Table 3.2 
Earnings  Functions  for  Black 
Females  for  the Year   I960 
The earnings  function of  black females   is  specified as: 
Log  Eb]=Log  Constant ( C)+Log  EDBL+Log  EXPBL+Log  DUM. 
Independent  Variable Estimated  Coefficient 
Constant 5.422 
EDBL .1234 
EXPBL .0257 
DUM .2146 
R-Squared=.A915 
-Significant  at .05  level 
Standard   E rror T Statistic 
•52551 10.318 
.05253 2.349* 
.01236 2.079* 
.11601 1.849* 
Table  3-3 
Earnings  Functions  for White 
Females  for  the Year  i960 
The earnings  function of white  females  is  specified as: 
Log   EWH=Log   Constant   (C)+Log   EDWH+Log   EXPWH+Log   DUM. 
independent  Variable :st mat ed  Coeff icient Standard  E rror T Statistic 
Constant 5.4628 .72828 7-501 
EDWH .1246 .05864 2.125* 
EXPWH .0291 .01430 2.032* 
DUM .0315 .08435 • 3732 
R-Squared=.1969 
-Significant  at 05 1 eve 
Table  3.4 
Summary Values  for  the  Independent 
Variables  for  the Year of  I960 
VARIABLE MEAN VARIANCE 
EDWH 11.0075 .5479 
EDBL 9.8175 1.3*66 
EXPWH 14.5900 8.8459 
EXPBL 9-9849 10.8864 
STANDARD COEFFICIENT OF 
DEVIATION VARIATION 
.7402 .0672 
1.1604 .1182 
2.9742 .2039 
3.2995 • 3304 
Table  3.5 
Earnings  Gap Attributable  to Labor Market 
Discrimination and  to  Differences   in 
Productivity  for  the Year  I960 
BLACK MEAN PREDICTED 
VARIABLE VALUE VALUE 
CONSTANT   -1136.46 -1136.46 
EDWH                    184.51 9.82 1811.89 
EXPWH                      39-58 10.89 431.03 
DUM                        34.40 0.50 17.20 
PREDICTED  EARNINGS   OF   BLACKS    1123.66 
ACTUAL  EARNINGS  OF  BLACKS      1146.05 
ACTUAL  EARNINGS   OF WHITES       1489.32 
Labor Market  Discrimination=  1146.05-1123.66 
1146.05 
Productivity  Differences= 1489-32-1123.66 
1489.32 
-2% 
+24.551 
Table  3.6 
Median   Incomes of Black and White 
Females  for  the Year of   I960 
RACE MEAN VARIANCE 
BLACK      1146.05      134313. 
WHITE      1489.32      131437. 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
366.487 
362.542 
COEFFICIENT  OF 
VARIATION 
.2461 
• 3163 
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Empirical   Results  from  the  1970 Census  of Population 
The earnings  functions  for  both  black and white  females  estimated 
on the  basis  of   1970  data  are presented   in Tables  3-8 and  3.9.     The results 
are quite  different  from those obtained  using   I960 data.     Median education 
and work  experience  are  not  significant variables   in  predicting   income  for 
black or white  females,  whereas   in   I960 both of  these  variables  were 
significant  at  the   .05   level.     The  constant  terms   is  not of as  much  impor- 
tance  in   1970 and   it was   in  I960;   in  both  instances   (I960)   the  constant 
term was  significant  and  positive,   but only  in  one  instance  in   1970  is 
the constant  term almost  significant  and  positive,   and  that occurs   in  the 
earnings   function  of  black  females.     The dummy  variable  for  the white 
female  earnings  function  is  not  significant,   indicating,  as   in  I960, 
that geographic  region  has   little   influence upon  annual   earnings.     On 
the other  hand,   the dummy variable  for  the black  female earnings  function 
is  positive and  significant at  the   .01   level,   indicating  that  those  black 
females who  reside   in  the  twenty  southern SMSA's  experienced  relatively 
more   labor market  discrimination  in   1970  than  they did   in   I960. 
Table  3.7   indicates  the  test  for  differences   in   income  for  black 
and white  females;   Table  3.10 summarizes  the values  for  the  independent 
variables;   Table  3-11   shows   those portions of  the  earnings gap attributable 
to  labor market  discrimination  and  to differences   in  productivity,   and 
Table 3.12  reveals   the median   income of  black and white  females. 
The  results  suggest  that   (1)     statistically  there  is  a  difference 
between  the earnings  of  black and white  females   living   in the  southern 
and combined  SMSA's   (the United States)   but,   that   there   is   little  differ- 
ence between  the  earnings  of white and black females   living   in  the 
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non-southern  SMSA's   (2)     black  females  living  in  the southern  SMSA's   face 
more   labor market  discrimination   in  1970  than  they  did   in   I960   (3)     median 
education  and work experience  are  no  longer   important   (significant)   vari- 
ables   in explaining  annual   earnings of black or white  females   CO     that 
most  of  the  difference   in  earnings  may be  attributed  to productivity  and 
not  to   labor  market  discrimination. 
With   respect  to  ffk,   the  analysis  suggests,  as   it  did  using   I960 
data,   that  white  females   faced  reversed discrimination of  approximately 
3%  in   1970;   an   increase of   \%  since   I960.     Again,   this  finding  should be 
considered  as   surprising  and  contrary  to  real   life  situations. 
Table 3-7 
Test  for  Differences  Between   Incomes of Black 
and White  Females  for  the Year of  1970 
t= 
(M]-M2)-do 
estimated 6 difference 
(M -MJ-d      where d =0 
V: S
2+N  S2 
112  2 
1+N2-2 
N +N 
1     2 
White  Female Black  Female 
Reg i on Earni ngs Earni ngs T Statistics 
Southern SMSA's 2442.85 1926.20 3-13* 
Non-Southern  SMSA's 2417.30 2509.25 -.5508 
United  States 2430.07 2217-72 1.71* 
-Significant  at   .05  level 
s Table  3.8 
Earnings Functions for Black 
Females  for the Year  1970 
The earnings  function of black females   is  specified as: 
Log  EBL=Log  Constant   (C)+Log  EDBL+Log  EXPBL+Log  DUM. 
Independent  Variable Estimated Coefficient 
Constant A.7992 
EDBL .2299 
EXPBL .0083 
DUM .2253 
R-Squared-.2776 
^Significant at .05 level 
—Significant at .01 level 
Standard  Error 
2.97167 
.24*7* 
.01597 
.08880 
Statistic 
1.6149* 
.9394 
-.5226 
2.536** 
Table 3-9 
Earnings  Function  for White 
Females  for  the Year  1970 
The earnings  function of white  females  is  specified  as: 
Log  EWH=Log  Constant   (C)+Log  EDWH+Log  EXPWH+Log  DUM. 
1ndependent Var" able Estima ted Coeffic ent Standard  Error T Statistic 
Constant 5 .2556 ^.03857 1 .301 
EDWH .1916 .32328 • 5925 
EXPWH .0127 .00991* 1.274 
DUM .0256 • 065731* -.3907 
R-Squared=. 355* 
Table  3.10 
Summary  Values  for  the   Independent 
Variables  for  the Year of  1970 
VARIABLE MEAN VARIANCE 
EDWH 12.4275 .0112 
EDBL 12.2300 .0334 
EXPWH 12.2800 9.97135 
EXPBL 6.7175 5-96403 
STANDARD COEFFICIENT  OF 
DEVIATION VARIATION 
.1062 .0085 
.1828 .0149 
3.1577 .2571 
2.4421 • 3635 
Table  3-11 
Earnings  Gap Attributable  to  Labor Market 
Discrimination  and  to Differences   in 
Productivity for the Year 1970 
BLACK MEAN PREDICTED 
VARIABLE VALUE VALUE 
CONSTANT -5922.98 -5922.98 
EDWH                      647.63 12.23 7920.51 
EXPWH                      28.11 6.72 188.90 
DUM                        -81.16 0.50 -40.58 
PREDICTED   EARNINGS   OF   BLACKS    2145.85 
ACTUAL  EARNINGS  OF  BLACKS  2217.72 
ACTUAL  EARNINGS  OF WHITES  2430.07 
Labor Market  Discrimination=  2217-72-2145.85      -3% 
2217.72 
Productivity  Differences= 2430.07-2145.85      +11.69% 
2430.07 
Table  3.12 
Median   Incomes   of   Black   and  White 
Females  for  the Year  of  1970 
RACE MEAN VARIANCE 
BLACK      2217.72       390570. 
WHITE      2^30.07      207373- 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
62^.956 
'♦55-382 
COEFFICIENT  OF 
VARIATION 
.2818 
. 1871* 
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Productivity  Variables  and  The  Earnings  Gap 
Earlier  the  analysis  of   the earnings  gap between white  and black 
females   suggested   that most  of   the   income  differential   could  be  explained 
by differences   in  productivity   rather  than   by  labor market  discrimination. 
The productivity  variables necessary  to examine  this  differential 
are:     1)     median education  difference of  black and white  females   (MEDDIFF); 
2)     labor  force participation  rate of  black  females   (LFPR);   3)     black 
male unemployment  rate   (BLMLUE) ;   k)     percentage of  blacks   in  the  total 
population   (PERBLPOP);   5)      the  square of the percentage of  the   blacks   in 
the total   population    (SPERBLPOP);  and  6)     the  total   unemployment   rate 
(TUER).     Median education  difference of black and white  females  may be 
viewed  primarily as  a  productivity variable,  whereas   the other  variables 
may be  considered  supply  variables. 
The  effect  that median education difference has on  the  earnings 
differential   is   likely  to be  exaggerated  because unlike  the case of males, 
females  who graduate   from  high  school   and  college enter  the   labor market. 
Generally  speaking,   highly  educated white  females  tend  to marry  males who 
are employed   in  higher  productivity areas,  and  therefore,   higher  paying 
jobs.     The  result   is   that   they may  not  enter   the  labor market. 
The   labor  force  participation  rate of  black females  and   the  black 
male unemployment  rate  are   important  variables.    A priori   reasoning 
would   indicate  that  black males  are discriminated against or  underemployed 
by  the  labor market   necessitating  the  entry  of a  relatively   larger  number 
of black  females   into   the   labor market willing  to accept  a   lower   than 
average wage  rate.     Thus  the  effect of  forcing  the black  female   into 
the  labor market will   tend   to widen  the earnings gap. 
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The  percentage of  blacks   in  the  total   population  and  the accom- 
panying  square  term are  important because they  allow examination of  the 
"cultural   dominance"  hypothesis.     The  cultural   dominance  hypothesis 
suggests   that  discrimination against  blacks   is  negligible where blacks 
make up  a  small   portion of  the  population,   that   it   increases  as   the 
percentage  of  blacks   in  the population   increases,  and  that   it  declines 
when blacks  obtain  a   large majority. 
The   total   unemployment   rate allows examination  of what  effect 
unemployment   in  all   sectors  of  the economy has on  the earnings  gap. 
That  is,  will   increases   (decreases)   in  the  total   unemployment  rate 
increase   (decrease)   the earnings  gap? 
Methodology 
Separate  regressions  are estimated  for  the southern,  non-southern, 
and  combined  SMSA's  for both  I960 and   1970.     This allows  examination  for 
differences   in  earnings  between  the geographic  regions  during a period 
in  time and   through  time.     Because of possible multicol1inearity among 
some of  the   independent variables,   regressions  using a  combination(s)   of 
the  variables  are utilized.     These  regressions  serve  the purpose of 
focusing on   the   relative  importance of  the variables   in explaining  the 
earnings  differential.     Not  all  of  the  regressions  are presented or 
discussed.     The most   important  equations  are found  in  the  text. 
Further  Empirical   Results     From  the  I960 and 
1970 Census  of  Population 
The  statistical   results  are  based on a  sample of  twenty  tradi- 
tionally  southern and  twenty  non-southern  SMSA's.     The  SMSA's  employed 
are  the  same  as   those  employed   in   the earlier analysis  pertaining  to 
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labor  market  discrimination.     The dependent  variable  is  the absolute 
difference  between white  female earnings  and  black  female earnings; 
denoted    I Ywf"Ybf I   •     Tne   independent  variables  are  those variables 
discussed  earlier   in  this   section.     The  results  of  the  regression analysis 
are presented   in  Tables   3.13  thru  3-18, with  the  t  values  placed  below 
the appropriate  coefficient.     The  I960  results  are presented  first   in  the 
following order   1)     southern  SMSA's  2)     non-southern  SMSA's  and  3)     combined 
SMSA's.     The  results   for   1970 are presented   in  the  same order. 
s Given   that  X2=MEDDIFF;   Xj=LFPR;  Xl,=BLMLUE;   X5=PERBLP0P; 
X6=SPERBLPOP;   X7=TUER,   the  regressions  presented  in 
Tables  3-13  thru  3-18  reveal   the  importance of  these 
independent  variables   in explaining  the  earnings 
differential   that existed  between white and black 
females  for  the years of  I960 and   1970.     Tables 
3.13  thur  3.15  reflect  the  use of  I960 data and 
Tables  3-16  thru  3-18  reflect  the  use of   1970 data. 
3 Given   that  X2=MEDDIFF;   X?=LFPR;   Xi,=BLMLUE;   X5=PERBLP0P; 
X6=SPERBLPOP;   X,=TUER,   the  regressions  presented   In 
Tables   3.13   thru   3-18   reveal   the   Importance  of   these 
independent   variables   In  explaining   the   earnings 
differential   that  existed between white  and  black 
females   for  the years of  I960  and   1970.     Tables 
3.13  thur  3.15  reflect   the use of   I960 data  and 
Tables   3.16  thru  3-18  reflect   the  use of   1970 data. 
Table 3.13 
I960 Southern SMSA's 
Ywf_Ybf  ■ 
Ywf"Ybf  - 
-212.84  -  201.45X2  +   14.26X3 +  3I.O3X5  -   .43X6 
(-.77)       (-2.16)*      (2.25)*      (1.98)*      (-1.7W 
R2 =  .39 F = 2. 44 
-7'»3.96 - 112.38X2 + I8.28X3 + *»9-07Xi» + I6.75X5 - .20Xt 
(-1.97)* (-1.15)   (2.95)** (1.90)*  (1.03)   (-.78) 
R2 = .52 F = 3-01 
Ywf"Ybf -649.25 -  118.^5X2 +  17.85X3 + 54.23X4 +  14.39X5 +  .17X6-   13.50X7 
(-1.39)     (-1.16) (2.73)**    (1.81) (.81) (-.62)   (-.38) 
R2 =  .52 F =  2.38 
*Significant at .05 level 
**Significant at .01 level 
L. 
Table  3-1 ^* 
I960  Non-Southern  SMSA's 
Ywf-Yfaf    = 107.43 +  A7.93X,   -   -42X,  +  22.68X5   -   .54X6 
(.76) (.91) (-.15)     (1.98)*      (-1.56) 
R2 =   .32 F =  1.78 
Ywf"  Ybf, = 
Ywf'Ybf    " 
;.65) 
R2   =   .32 
9) 
142.03 + 46.27X2  -   .8IX3  -   I.76X4 +  23.27Xc  -   .56XA 
;.8l.) (-.24)     (-.21)       (1.91) (-1.* 
I 
7.22 + 4l.50X2 + .12X3 - 2.48X4 
+ 22.IIX5 - .53X6 + 21.04X7 
(.02)  (.74)   (.03)  (-.29)  (1.77)*  (-1.38) (.73) 
F = 1.34 
Rz = .35 F = 1.17 
"Significant at .05 level 
Ywf_Ybf 
Ywf"Ybf 
Ywf"Ybf 
Table 3-15 
I960 Combined SMSA's 
27.76 + 43.02X2 + I.9OX3 + I8.O3X5 - .26Xt 
(.19)  (1.12)   (.67)   (2.37)*  (-1.69)* 
R2 = .37 F = 5.05 
-108.35 + A5.72X, + 3.25X, + 7-70X^ +  I8.I3XC -   .25Xfi 
(-.5*) (1.18) (1.02J       (.93) (2.38)*    (-1.6?)* 
R2 =   .38 F =  *.19 
-323.08 + *»9.55X?  + 4.91X, + 6.k\Xk +  17.72X.  -   .22X,  + 28.59X-, 
(-1.27)       (1.30) (1.467      (.78) (2.35)*       (-1.S6)   (1.35)' 
R2 =  .41 F = 3.89 
■Significant at .05 level 
•^^^HB^B 
CM Table  3-16 
1970 Southern  SMSA's 
Vwf-Vbf 
Ywf"Ybf 
YwfYbf 
3.44 + 401.63X2 + 5.65X3 +  12.30X5 -   .21X6 
(.003)   (.56) (.30 (.62) (-.83) 
R2  =   .10 F =   .42 
552.5^ + 477.84X, -  1.61X, - 42.29X/. -  13.08xq -  .22X6 
(.36) (.64) (-.07)       (-.48) 1.64) (-.83) 
R2   =   .11 F =   .36 
-2057-93 + I8.98X0 + 35.^9X9 -  49.16XL + 30.42Xc   -   .44X6 + 235.19X7 
(-.77) (.02) (.90) (-.67) (1.22)3      (-1.37)   (1.19) 
R2  =   .20 F =  .55 
YwfYbf 
Ywf_Ybf 1= 
Ywf"Ybf 
Table  3.17 
1970  Non-Southern  SMSA's 
189-54 +  68l.30X2  -  9.35Xo  +  12.21Xc  -   .20X6 
(.28) (.67) (-.84f      (.35) (-.30) 
R2 =  .16 F =   .72 
741.14 + 1216.92X2 - 13.33X3 - 53.96X4 + 7.88Xc - 
(1.06)  (1.27)     (-1-26J (-1.84)* (.24) 
R2 = .33     F = 1.35 
835.29 +  1238.26X,  -   13-76X, -  52.99X,, + 7.07Xr  - 
(.78)         (1.19)    Z      (-1.19? (-1.687*    (.20)3 
R2  =   .33 F =  1.05 
17X6 
(-.28) 
-17X6 -23.37X7 
(-.26)   (-.12) 
•Significant  at   .05  level 
Table 3-18 
1970 Combined SMSA's 
Ywf"Ybf 
Ywf"Ybf 
Ywf"Ybf 
84.61  + 688.98X, - 6.19X, + 26.65X. -  .35X,; 
(•17)       (1.13) (-.707      (1.57)*      (-1.39) .  
R2 =   .24 F = 2.73 
801.61 + IO87.65X2 -  II.76X3 - 68.75x4 + 20.17X5 -  .30X6 
(1.52)       (1.9D* M.43J       (-3.00)**  (1.31) (-1.32) 
R2 = .40 F = 4.49 
648.58 + 1059.47X2 -   10.67X, -  70.65X/, + 21.43XC -   .31X6 + 32.14X7 
(.88) (1.82)* (-1.18)       (-2.9*)**  (1-32) (-1.34)   (.30) 
R2 =   .40 F =  3.66 
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Analysis  of  the  Empirical   Findings 
of  the  Productivity  Variables 
Given  the  variables  employed   in  the  regressions,   several   points 
of  interest and   importance  should be  presented.     Therefore,   under a 
separate sub-heading  each variable and   its  behavior will   be presented 
and discussed. 
The Constant Term(C).     A constant of  zero  implies  that a  zero 
value  for  all   independent  variables would  totally  eliminate wage differ- 
ences.     In  the empirical   analysis of  the  I960 and   1970 data  the  constant 
term was  both  negative   (six  times)  and  positive   (twelve  times),   but  never 
was  it  significant  at   the   .05   level.     Given  that  the constant  term was 
never  significant   implies   that wage differences  between  black and white 
females  can  be explained   totally by  the   independent  variables. 
Median  Educational   Differences   (MEDDIFF).     This  variable should 
be the most   important  productivity  variable.     A priori   reasoning would 
indicate  this  variable's  coefficient  to  be  positive;   the variable works 
well   in  some  cases   (positive  and  significant)   but  not so well   in other 
cases   (negative and   insignificant).     The problem of who enters  the  labor 
market  influences   the  sign  and  the significance  level  of MEDDIFF. 
As  an  example of  how  the  coefficient approaches zero,  consider 
the following:     As   the  percentage of  highly educated white  females   increases, 
while  the  percentage of  highly  educated  black  females  remains  constant, 
MEDDIFF  increases.     Suppose now  that as   the percentage of  the highly 
educated white  females   increases,   less  and  less  of  them enter  the   labor 
market.     The  net   result of  the  above assumptions  are  that  average wage 
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differentials     |Ywf"
Y
bf |  •   remain constant while MEDDIFF  is   increasing. 
This would  give  a  zero slope  coefficient  for MEDDIFF. 
A   large  value of  MEDDIFF  implies  that   (1)     white  females  are more 
highly educated   than  their black counterparts  and   if   (2)     education  does 
reflect wage  differences,   and   if (3)     an equiproportional   level   of all 
white  females  enter  the  labor market,   then  MEDDIFF  should  be   large  and 
posi tive. 
If MEDDIFF   is   large and  negative a perverse  reaction  is  occurring; 
the assumption  that an equiproportional   level  of all  white  females  enter 
the  labor market   is  not  true.     i.e.  As   the general   level  of white  female 
education   increases,   less  and   less educated white  females work,  and  the 
average wages  of white  females,   Ywf,  decreases  the net  result  is  that wage 
differentials,     jYwf-Ybf   J,  decreases  as  MEDDIFF  increases. 
If  the assumption  that  education does  reflect wage differences   \s_ 
not  true  i.e.   female  discrimination  in  general  with   respect  to wages 
exists,   the  result   is   that  |Ywf-Ybf |    is  constant  and MEDDIFF  is   increasing; 
this  too,  would give a  zero slope coefficient  for MEDDIFF. 
White  females may not  enter  the   labor market  for  two reasons: 
(I)     those white  females  that graduated  from high  school   and college  tend 
to marry males  of  similar  education and  therefore,  devote  their  energies 
to becoming  home makers;   (2)     those white  females   that enter  the   labor 
market are  the   less  educated whites and  tend  to compete directly with  the 
black  females  for   the  same  jobs  or  those educated white  females  that 
enter  the  labor  force do so as  secondary wage earners  securing only 
part-time employment  at  relatively   low wages. 
% 
57 
If  either of  these possibilities   is   realized  then education will 
not  be an   important  determinant of  female earnings.     This will   tend  to 
be  reflected  by  both  the sign  and  the significance  level   of the coefficient. 
Labor  Force  Participation  Rates of  Black  Females   (LFPR).     Assume 
that  the demand  for  female  labor  is  constant.     Also assume  that  the  supply 
of white  female   labor   is  constant,   but  the  supply of black  female   labor 
is   increasing   (reflected  by   increases  in  the  LFPR).     If there were no 
discrimination  between  black  and white female  labor,   an  increase  in  the 
supply of  female   labor would  decrease the wages of both  black and white 
females and   the dependent  variable's  value,  IYwf-Y^j:  I,  would  remain 
constant.     If,   however,   a dual   labor market   is  in operation,  only black 
female wages  would  fall.     Therefore,   theoretically an   increase  in LFPR 
would  result   in an   increase   in  the  dependent  variable's  value,  or  stated 
alternatively   the  coefficient  for  LFPR would  become positive and  significant. 
The data  for  the   I960 Census  of Population  for  the southern SMSA's 
supports  this  statement.     LFPR was  both positive and  significant  in all 
three equations (see Table 3-13)  whereas  in   1970,   LFPR was   insignificant 
on all  occasions  and on  one occasion  negative   (see Table 3-16).     These 
results   indicate  that   the dua^   labor market  has been "shattered",  or 
stated alternatively,   the  results  ask  the question:   "Has  the dual   labor 
market been   'shattered',   if  it  ever existed?" 
Percentage of  Blacks   in  the  Population and  the Accompanying Square 
Term   (PERBLPOP and  SPERBLPOP).     The percentage of blacks  in  the population 
and   its accompanying   square  term allow examination of  the  idea of "cultural 
dominance".     Given  the equations  as  presented   in Table  3-19  the maximum 
58 
level  of discrimination  against  blacks  may  be computed  by  using  the 
following  formula:     (1)     Y=a+bx-cx  .     Differentiating  this  formula  to 
the first degree   it  becomes   (2)     dy/dx=b-2cx«0,   or( 3)     x=b/2c.     The 
formula  essentially  answers  the question,   "For what value of x  is  y 
maximized,  where y   is   the  dependent  variable of wage differences  and x 
is  the percentage of blacks   in  the population. 
In both  the   I960  and   1970 equations  MEDDIFF was  eliminated  because 
in each   instance   it  proved   to be  insignificant,   therefore,   it  can be 
assumed  to be of  minimal   consequence.     Using  the  I960 equation  discrimi- 
nation   is  maximized when  blacks  constitute 38 percent of  the population; 
in  1970 discrimination   is  maximized when  blacks  constitute approximately 
36 percent of  the  population. 
Graphically  the  results  may  be  shown as  follows: 
y 
(wage 
differences) 
x" PERBLPOP 
The distance  from  0  to xQ  represents  the "zone of   increasing  discrimination' 
If  this  "zone"   is  a  measure of   labor  supply,  as  the  percentage of 
blacks   increase   the  supply  curve of blacks  should  shift  outward  and   if the 
dual   labor market  exists,   the wages of blacks  should  fall.     If  this does 
not happen,  discrimination   is  due  to non-market  considerations.     If  the 
dual   labor market  does  not  exist  then   1)     white  salaries  should   fall   and/or 
2)    whites  may  be  moving out  of  the SMSA after  the population  surpasses 
40 percent  black  and   the dual   labor hypothesis  collapses. 
a Table   3.19 
I960 and  1970  Combined SMSA's  - 
Emphasis   on   Cultural   Dominance 
(The   I960   Equation   is   Presented   First) 
Ywf"Ybf  I   =     m-157 +   17.32Xc   -   .24X6 
(1.77)*  (1-63) 
R2 = .36      F = 6.68 
Ywf"Ybf I " -261.136 + 32.06Xc - .42X6 
(2.14)*       (-1.83) 
R2  =   .23 F =  3.53 
-Significant at   .05   level 
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Black Male Unemployment  Rate   (BLMLUE).     If the  value of  the 
coefficient   is   positive what  does   this   indicate?     It  might   indicate 
that a  high   level   of  BLMLUE  dictates an   increase  in  LFPR with  the  net 
result  being   that  black  female wages must  fall   relative  to white  female 
wages,   therefore,   the  value of  the dependent  variable,     Vwf-Ybf     ,  must 
increase.     Table  3.13  supports  this  statement,  because   in  I960 within  the 
southern  SMSA's  BLMLUE was  both  positive and  significant at  the  .05   level. 
This   in   itself  does  not  reflect  discrimination against  black  females,   it 
simply  reflects   labor  supply  conditions. 
The Total   Unemployment  Rate   (TUER).     In  no  instance was  this 
variable  significant.     On  several   occasions   the sign of  the  coefficient 
changed  from  positive  to negative,   and vice versa,   therefore,   rendering 
its  use   in an  analytical   discussion  useless. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The  purpose of  this   thesis was   to analyze  statistically  the general 
hypothesis   that  there  exists an   income  differential   between  black and white 
females   in  the United  States work  force. 
Chapter  1   focused  on  the  problem of defining  discrimination.     After 
an appropriate discussion  on  the  definition of discrimination most economists 
would agree  that discrimination,  or  types of discrimination  can  be  classi- 
fied  into one  of  the  following categories:     (1)     employment  discrimination, 
(2)    wage  discrimination,   (3)     occupational   discrimination,   (<t)     human 
capital  discrimination,   (5)     capital  discrimination,   (6)     racial   discrimi- 
nation,   (7)     sex discrimination,  and/or (8)     price discrimination.     In 
addition  to a  discussion of   the  various   types of discrimination,   statistical 
data were  presented with  respect  to median  incomes of females,   labor  force 
status  of women,  distribution  by  major occupation of employed women by 
marital   status  and  race,  and marital   status of female heads of families. 
Chapter  2 examined   the  theories  of the economics of  discrimination. 
Gary Becker's  model  was  given  particular emphasis,   because his work  is 
considered  by  many economists  as  the most complete  statement of the neo- 
classical  model   of  the  economics  of  discrimination.     Chapter  2 also contains 
relevant  sugary discussions  of  the works  of Ann  Krueger,  Marcus Alexis, 
Richard Freeman,   Barbara  Bergmann  and  Kenneth Arrow,  all  of whom modify 
the Becker  model   in  their analysis  of discrimination. 
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The works  of Michael   Piore and Peter  Doeringer are also  included 
in Chapter 2  because  these  economists  are associated with  the "dual   labor 
market  hypothesis".     This  hypothesis  specifically challenges   the neoclas- 
sical  model   developed  by  Becker.     In  essence,   this chapter  represented  a 
review of  the  current   literature on  the economics of discrimination. 
Chapter  3  contains   the  development of the econometric model   and 
statistical   tests   related   to  the model.     This chapter   investigates  closely 
the  causes  of  the  earnings  gap  that  existed  between black and white  females 
in  I960 and  1970  and  estimates  how much of  this   income differential   can  be 
attributed  to  (l)     differences   in education  and other variables  related 
to  labor—market  productivity,  and   (2)     how much   is assignable  to  labor 
market discrimination. 
Conclusions 
The  results  suggest  the  following conclusions:   (  1)     Statistically 
there  is  a  difference   in  the  earnings  of black and white  females  in the 
same  geographic  region,   but   that  the difference  in earnings   is attributable 
to differences   in  productivity and  not  to  labor market discrimination. 
(2)    White  females   faced  reverse  labor market  discrimination;  for example, 
in  I960 white  females  were  discriminated against,   relative  to black females, 
by approximately  2%;    in  1970  this  figure had   increased  to approximately 
3*.     This   increase   in   labor market discrimination  is   in part attributable 
to the  increased  participation of  the white  female   in  the   labor market 
over  this   ten year  period.     Although data corroborates  this  finding, 
caution  is  suggested   in  the   interpretation of  this  conclusion.     (3)     There 
esists  a  threshold   level  of  discrimination against  blacks;  when  the black 
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population   reaches  approximately k0%,  discrimination  is  at   its  maximum. 
(It)     The most   important  variables   in  determining   income  for both black 
and white  females  are  education  and work experience. 
Data  Restraints  and  Evaluation 
A criticism of  this work  is  Its  use,   out of  necessity,  of aggregate 
cross-sectional   data.     The  thesis would  have  had  a  sharper focus on  the 
problem of  the   income  differentials  that existed between  black and white 
females  for   the years  of  I960 and  1970  if data on  a given occupational 
class  could  have been obtained.     Also,   because of a  lack of available 
data,   there was  no consideration given  to  those  females  employed on a 
part-time basis when  data were  collected  for  the analysis  of  income differ- 
entials.     This   in   itself would  have affected  the salary   levels,   and  thus 
the earnings,   of  black  and white females. 
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SOUTHERN   SMSA'S,    I960   DATA APPENDIX  A 
SMSA 
Medi an Medi 
Educat ion Inco 
Black White Black 
8.8 11.6 902 
9.9 11.3 941 
8.5 10.0 925 
8.3 10.7 914 
8.8 10.6 718 
8.8 10.5 786 
8.8 11 .2 981 
8.0 10.5 686 
8.5 11.4 1124 
8.7 10.8 868 
9-1 10.8 870 
8.5 10.7 776 
9.1 10.3 946 
9.1 11.3 1060 
7-5 9.5 589 
10.4 11.9 1895 
9.8 10.0 885 
9-1 10.0 1263 
8.3 11.0 731 
10.4 12.0 995 
White 
Labor  Force 
Part ici pat ion 
Rate of 
Black Females 
Total 
Unemploy- 
ment 
Rate 
Black Male 
Unemploy- 
ment 
Rate 
Percentage 
of Blacks 
in 
Populat ion 
Median 
Age 
Black White 
Charlotte 
Houston 
New Orleans 
Little Rock 
Bi rmingham 
Mobile 
Atlanta 
Augusta 
Miami 
Jacksonvi 1 le 
Nashville 
Memphis 
Loui svi1le 
Richmond 
Jackson 
Washington 
Huntington- 
Ashland 
Baltimore 
Charleston 
Oklahoma 
City 
4.9 
7-3 
9.9 
6.9 
11.9 
11.7 
4.5 
6.8 
7.2 
6.3 
5.5 
7.5 
10.7 
6.5 
6.6 
5-5 
8.4 
9-7 
8.0 
6.3 
27.905 
19.816 
30.798 
18.582 
34.581 
32.124 
38.252 
50.744 
22.357 
41.051 
19.121 
36.274 
11.471 
26.283 
39-963 
53-895 
2.944 
21.920 
36.273 
8.024 
22.9 
24.5 
24.6 
25.8 
25.4 
22.6 
25.7 
23.9 
23.7 
26.0 
27. 9 
24. 2 
28 9 
27 5 
21 4 
26 9 
32 8 
24 .7 
19 .5 
23 .3 
29.1 
28.0 
31.4 
30.4 
30.6 
27.1 
29-1 
27.4 
35.8 
28.1 
30.0 
29.6 
29.6 
32.6 
28.8 
31.1 
30.2 
31.9 
25-9 
29.6 
NON-SOUTHERN   SMSA'S,    1960   DATA APPENDIX   B 
SMSA 
Denver 
Kansas   City 
Fargo 
Eugene 
San  Bernardino 
Debroit 
Las  Vegas 
Bi11ings 
Buffalo 
New York 
Pittsburg 
Salt  Lake  City 
Manchester 
Providence 
Boston 
Cleveland 
Indianapolis 
Portland 
Columbus 
Gary 
Median 
Education 
Black White 
11.2 
10.2 
12.2 
M.9 
10.5 
10. 1 
12.0 
11.1 
9-4 
10.2 
9.9 
10.8 
10.7 
10.0 
10.8 
10.2 
11.2 
11.1 
10.3 
10.7 
12.1 
11.9 
12.1 
10.5 
11.7 
11.0 
12.1 
11.1 
10.6 
10.8 
10.8 
12.2 
11.0 
10.1 
12.1 
11.1 
10.1 
11.1 
12.0 
9.8 
Median 
Income 
Black     White 
1563 
1151 
767 
1398 
1125 
1427 
I885 
1085 
1403 
2035 
1090 
957 
1638 
1163 
1761 
1537 
1373 
1058 
1326 
1355 
1717 
1710 
765 
1474 
1490 
1706 
2070 
1085 
1586 
2167 
1384 
1399 
1492 
1607 
1833 
17*2 
1852 
1099 
1718 
1457 
Labor  Force 
Participat ion 
Rate of 
Black  Females 
46.4 
45-5 
100.0 
37.0 
34.9 
35-9 
A3.8 
37-7 
34.4 
50.8 
31.8 
50.3 
39.9 
38.6 
29.6 
1.2.6 
46.9 
38.2 
46.5 
27.9 
Total 
Unemploy- 
ment 
Rate 
3.2 
6.7 
3.0 
A.9 
6.5 
6.9 
3.0 
3.0 
7.0 
5.3 
9-3 
3.6 
5-5 
7.0 
A.3 
5.0 
4.5 
6.0 
3.9 
5-3 
Black Male 
Unemploy- 
ment 
Rate 
6.0 
9.3 
0.0 
10.1 
11. 4 
18.0 
9.8 
23.8 
15-7 
6.8 
16.5 
3.7 
0.0 
9.8 
7.3 
12.6 
7.6 
18.A 
10.6 
5-6 
Percentage 
of  Blacks 
i n 
Population 
3-394 
11.217 
.0002 
.002 
3.670 
14.854 
8.664 
.002 
6-3*43 
11.478 
6.713 
.oo4 
.002 
1.764 
3.003 
14.320 
20.587 
.003 
11.748 
38.763 
Median 
Age 
Black 
25.6 
27.6 
16.8 
21.7 
20.6 
White 
26.1 
21.7 
23.6 
23.9 
28.9 
28.7 
24.6 
21.8 
22.7 
26.7 
26.7 
27.3 
26.5 
26.4 
22.0 
29.0 
33.1 
27.1 
27.8 
32.4 
30.2 
28.8 
26.4 
32.1 
35-5 
36.1 
29.1 
34.4 
37.4 
33-9 
33.0 
30.9 
34.4 
28.8 
27.2 
s SOUTHERN SMSA'S, 1970 DATA   APPENDIX C 
SMSA 
Charlotte 
Houston 
New Orleans 
Little Rock 
Birmingham 
Mobile 
Atlanta 
Augusts 
Miami 
Jacksonvi1 le 
Nashvi1le 
Memphis 
Louisvi1le 
Richmond 
Jackson 
Washington 
Huntington- 
Ashland 
Baltimore 
Charleston 
Oklahoma 
City 
Median 
Education 
Black White 
12.1 
12.3 
12.1 
12. 1 
12.2 
12.2 
12.2 
12.1 
12.0 
12.2 
12.2 
12.1 
12.2 
12.1 
11.7 
12.3 
12.2 
12.1 
12.0 
12. 4 
12.A 
12.5 
12.5 
12.it 
12.3 
12.3 
12.5 
12.3 
12.4 
12.4 
12.3 
12.A 
12.3 
12.3 
12.4 
12.6 
12.3 
12.3 
12.3 
12.5 
Median 
Income 
Black 
1919 
1813 
1659 
1889 
1393 
1253 
2100 
1618 
2163 
2420 
1861 
1595 
1928 
2179 
1442 
3645 
1520 
2^99 
1425 
2203 
White 
2755 
2490 
2116 
2628 
1907 
1800 
2886 
2413 
2526 
1691 
2521 
2212 
25^9 
2857 
2280 
3861 
1942 
2753 
2165 
3505 
Labor Force Total Black Male Percentage Med an 
Part icipation Unemploy- Unemploy- of Blacks Age 
Rate of ment ment in 
Black Females Rate Rate Population Black White 
93.2 2.0 2.8 18.219 22.6 28.9 
86.8 2.2 3.8 19.263 22.9 27.0 
90.9 4.6 7.7 30.959 22.9 29.7 
92.5 2.3 5-9 18.487 23-3 30.0 
90.2 3.5 5.3 29.413 26.1 31.9 
89.3 A.5 7.9 29.985 22.9 28.7 
94.0 2.3 3.8 22.344 24.5 28.3 
92.0 3.3 *.7 27.782 23.7 27.7 
95. *» 3.0 5.3 14.960 22.4 38.7 
92.6 2.1 4.8 22.341 24.6 28.7 
94.9 2.6 4.6 17.780 25.0 30.0 
91.3 2.9 7.2 29.724 22.7 29.3 
92.2 2.8 6.2 12.320 25.5 29.0 
95.1 1.8 3-5 25.127 25.7 30.8 
92.7 3.1 5. k 38.240 21.8 29.8 
95.1 2.3 h. 3 71.077 24.8 27.9 
93.7 5.1 4.4 2.737 33.4 31.6 
93.3 2.8 5.8 23.664 23.8 30.9 
91.6 3.8 5.3 31.191 22.1 25.4 
94.0 2.9 5.0 3.372 22.5 28.8 
NON-SOUTHERN   SMSA'S,    1970  DATA APPENDIX  D 
SMSA 
Denver 
Kansas  City 
Fargo 
Eugene 
San  Bernardino 
Detroit 
Las  Vegas 
Bi11ings 
Buffalo 
New  York 
Pittsburg 
Salt  Lake  City 
Manchester 
Providence 
Boston 
Cleveland 
Indianapoli s 
Portland 
Columbus 
Gary 
Median Median 
Education 1ncome 
Black [White Black White 
12. 4 12.6 2642 2575 
12.* 12.5 2411 2831 
12.6 12.7 2211 1663 
12.6 12.5 4122 1973 
12.3 12.4 2109 2260 
12.2 12.4 2740 2739 
12.3 12.A 2675 3088 
12.1* 12.5 1344 1803 
12.1 12.5 2544 2333 
12.2 12.A 3427 3260 
12.3 12.5 2027 2089 
12. 4 12.5 205** 1878 
12.8 12.4 2469 2361 
12.2 12.4 2215 2478 
12.2 12.7 2939 2762 
12.2 12.4 2623 2656 
12.1 12.3 2857 2794 
12.2 12.4 2056 1961 
12.3 12.5 2617 2640 
12.3 12.4 2173 2202 
Labor   Force 
Participation 
Rate  of 
Black  Females 
Total 
Unemploy- 
ment 
Rate 
83.5 
93.5 
100.0 
100.0 
91.2 
88.9 
93.8 
100.0 
89.4 
95.2 
92.0 
86.5 
100.0 
94.6 
93.9 
93.2 
91.8 
100.0 
94.5 
87.6 
2.9 
4.0 
2.6 
3.5 
4.8 
3.6 
2.6 
2.6 
3-7 
3.2 
2.5 
4.5 
2.7 
3.7 
3.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.9 
2.3 
2.8 
Black Male 
Unemploy- 
ment 
Rate 
6.0 
6.5 
0.0 
12.1 
11.1 
9.8 
5.2 
0.0 
9.1 
5-2 
9.4 
8.8 
0.0 
5.0 
7.1 
7.7 
8.5 
18.4 
5-9 
4.4 
Percentage 
of  Blacks 
in 
Population 
4.086 
12.052 
.059 
.348 
13.991 
18.026 
11.195 
.259 
20.383 
16.292 
20.169 
1.214 
.229 
8.858 
16.333 
38.333 
18.037 
.657 
18.460 
52.843 
Median 
Age 
Black White 
23.6 
24.4 
30.0 
20.8 
21.7 
24.1 
20.1 
25.0 
22.8 
26.8 
27.4 
21.9 
20.6 
22.9 
23-3 
25.0 
24.3 
23.7 
24.2 
22.1 
27.4 
29.6 
24.9 
26.9 
29.4 
28.9 
27.5 
27.0 
31.4 
35.0 
33.9 
24.0 
33.0 
38.8 
31.6 
31.5 
28.5 
31.9 
27.0 
27-0 
SUMMARY OF DATA, 1960   APPENDIX E 
NON-SOUTHERN SMSA's 
STANDARD  DEVIATION VARIABLE MEAN 
11.21 
10.72 
COEFFICIENT OF  VARIATION 
EDWH 
EDBL 
.770 
.718 
.068727 
.066976 
YWH 1566.85 329.890 .210544 
YBL 135*.8S 319.702 
.235968 
BLMLUE 10.15 6.101 
.601112 
LFPR i*2.9i» 14.953 .3118269 
PERBLPOP 7.83 9.515 1.215690 
TUER 5.20 1.702 .327712 
SOUTHERN SMSA's 
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD  DEVIATION 
EDWH 10.81 .667 
EDBL 
YWH 
1.92 
1411.80 
.744 
392.700 
YBL 
BLMLUE 
LFPR 
PERBLPOP 
TUER 
937.25 
7.61 
42.59 
28.62 
4.85 
275.313 
3-153 
7.982 
13.397 
2.007 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION 
.061718 
.083387 
.278156 
.293746 
.283162 
.187436 
.468117 
.413914 
OJ APPENDIX E  CONT'D 
COMBINED SMSA's 
VARIABLE 
EDWH 
EDBL 
YWH 
YBL 
BLMLUE 
LFPR 
PERBLPOP 
TUER 
MEAN     STANDARD DEVIATION 
ll.oi -7*0 
9.82 1.160 
1489.32 366.487 
1146.05 362.542 
8.88 4.696 
42.76 H-832 
18.22 15.569 
5.02 1.846 
COEFFICIENT  OF  VARIATION 
.067244 
.118200 
.246076 
.316340 
.529016 
.276710 
.854373 
.367447 
SUMMARY  OF   DATA,    1970 APPENDIX  F 
NON-SOUTHERN SMSA's 
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD   DEVIATION COEFFICIENT  OF   VARIATION 
EDWH 12.47 .103 .008265 
EDBL 12.32 .176 .014325 
YWH 2417-30 439-043 .181625 
YBL 2509-25 580.245 .231242 
BLMLUE 7.01 4.374 .623942 
LFPR 51.29 13-813 .269339 
PERBLPOP 13-59 13-527 .995262 
TUER 3.1* .725 .230904 
SOUTHERN  SMSA's 
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD  DEVIATION COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION 
EDWH 21.39 .093 .007533 
EDBL 12.14 .143 .011768 
YWH 2442.85 482.242 .197410 
YBL 1926.20 534.876 .277684 
BLMLUE 5.19 1.343 .259077 
LFPR 50.07 5-293 .105731 
PERBLPOP 24.39 14.195 .581766 
TUER 2.99 .913 .304761 
APPENDIX F  CONT'D 
COMBINED   SMSA s 
VARIABLE MEAN 
12.A3 
STANDARD  DEVIATION 
.106 
COEFFICIENT  OF  VARIATION 
EDWH .008542 
EDBL 12.23 .183 .014949 
YWH 2430.07 455-382 .187394 
YBL 2217.72 624.956 .281801 
BLMLUE 6.10 3-325 .545242 
LFPR 50.68 10.343 .204113 
PERBLPOP 18.20 14.739 -775961 
TUER 3.07 .817 .266318 
: 
